J'ai tout lu...

par The Bull , Guinée, mardi 13 juin 2006, 17:39 (il y a 6729 jours) @ labadie

PIMCO a expliqué dans une page l'origine et le nourrissement de la bulle de crédit actuelle, ses conclusions sont claires : c'est fini aux USA Link

J'ai lu ce matin dans Les Echos un papier incroyable qui disait en substance qu'en ce moment aux USA les experts de la FED préparent l'économie américaine à connaître au moins 3 trimestres de croissance à 1%... (Experts HSBC sur l'analyse du marché d'hier).

Le but est simple : ralentir l'économie (donc le crédit et les bulles subséquentes), pour reconstituer l'épargne américaine, et surtout provoquer une baisse du pétrole (par une baisse de la demande d'un pays qui absorbe 25% de la production mondiale de pétrole !).

Enfin... J'aime bien ce papier, aussi je te le recopie in extenso :

HOW WE GOT HERE
Phase I: Stimulus through Monetary Easing. Following the recession and 9-11, the U.S. Federal Reserve implemented monetary easing to a degree not seen in almost 50 years. Cheap money and credit flooded the U.S. economy in an effort to prevent a serious recession (which had the risk of turning deflationary like Japan’s). The lax monetary policy had the intended effect of stimulating consumer spending (particularly on assets like homes and real estate).

Phase II: Illusion Becomes Reality. By 2003, prices of real estate began rising faster than the rate of inflation. In effect, investors began noticing how “profitable” it was to accumulate real assets. Rising prices created a “virtuous cycle” whereby more and more buyers participated in the equation of purchasing real estate. While admittedly rising prices were driving down yields, few cared about yield because the Fed was not rewarding saving. The preferred game was appreciation.

Phase III: Lenders “Pile In” (the final period of play). Given a few years of rising prices, real estate began looking very safe; low rates made the cost of debt very manageable, justifying higher prices and larger loans. By 2005 real estate lending was extraordinarily competitive, (after all, default rates were at historic lows). By 2006, cheap and easy mortgages had grown to epic proportions throughout the real estate industry. “No money down” became the way to purchase a home. Foreign and hedge fund capital poured into mortgage markets chasing yields of the “risky” tranches of mortgage paper (why settle for the 5% yield of “A tranche” if the risky “B tranche” yielded at 8-10%>) With rising property values, the “B tranches” were soon re-rated to “A”, rewarding the buyers with phenomenal appreciation in their mortgage paper. Mortgages become more plentiful and the tide of easy money rises into uncharted territory, and bringing real estate values even closer to rocky shores hidden beneath a tidal flood.

Phase IV: Inflection Point Achieved (the cost of money rises). Satisfied that it had prevented a serious deflationary recession, by June 2004 the Federal Reserve begins to slowly increase rates. By 2006, the Fed Rate had increased from 1% to 4.5% (the “neutral rate” – not deemed excessively simulative by economists). With yields this high, it again makes sense to hold cash at the bank. By 2006, the cost of mortgage debt is returning to the long term average.

THE NEXT FEW YEARS
Phase V: - The Future: Look Out Below. The problem becomes obvious and virulent when real estate values begin to fall. With debt service costs rising, real estate begins to flounder, and more risky real estate ends up on the rocks. As default rates rise, mortgages slowly become more expensive and difficult to obtain (“real estate becomes a four letter word” in the parlance of an old banker). Only brave and knowledgeable entrepreneurs venture onto the scene of real estate wreckage at the lowest tide. Only a “foolhardy lender” would venture between the rocks of the now quiet ebb tide.

The “virtuous cycle” has completed its turn into the “vicious cycle.”

HOUSING AND CONSUMER SPENDING
It is our view that the “irrational exuberance” has transferred from stocks to housing, setting up conditions for a “housing deflation.” We expect a serious fall-off of home construction, sales and values, starting in 2006, and becoming very pronounced by 2007. A glut of new houses will accumulate in the next 12-24 months, causing a drop in price and construction of new units, and setting up a serious risk of price decline (similar to the “tech wreck” in the stock market).